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   +  This Article had its genesis in a paper I originally prepared with Nikki Flores (a law 
student intern in the EEOC Chicago District Office) for delivery at the November 8, 2010, 
meeting of the American Bar Association Section of Labor and Employment Law in Chicago. 
That paper, which is the source of much of what follows here, was entitled: What Lies Ahead? 
Notice Pleading and Iqbal and Twombly in EEOC Employment Discrimination Litigation. In 
the intervening years, I have repeatedly updated What Lies Ahead? to take into account more 
recent developments, and various versions of it have been published in continuing legal educa-
tion publications of the Chicago Bar Association, the Practicing Law Institute, the American 
Bar Association, and Law Bulletin Seminars. With each of those updates, the motion to dismiss 
proceedings in EEOC v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 09-CV-5291, 2010 WL 3700704 (N.D. 
Ill. filed Aug. 27, 2009), emerged as the subject of more discussion, to the extent I concluded, 
at the risk of being accused of recycling of my own work too much, that a separate paper more 
narrowly focused on United Parcel Service was warranted. I was also fascinated by the court’s 
consideration of the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, although it is true that this Article is de-
rivative of and draws freely and at length from What Lies Ahead?, I make no apologies because 
the subject matter is fascinating.
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John C. Hendrickson*
 
 I find it intriguing, as a U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) regional attorney, that a significant number of defense counsel in various 
EEOC cases contemporaneously seize upon the same litigation strategy or tactic. 
One has the sense that they all attend the same seminars and fear failing to use the 
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tactic du jour. A trend recently in vogue, and I believe happily now on the wane, 
involved moving to dismiss EEOC complaints on the basis of tortured readings of 
the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding notice pleading in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), coupled 
especially with an “outlier” decision of the Northern District of Iowa in EEOC v. 
CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Iowa 2009), rev’d  679 F.3d 
657  (8th Cir. 2012). 
 Based on these decisions and a few others, defense counsel have argued 
that the EEOC cannot seek monetary or other relief for victims of employment 
discrimination unless the victims have been individually identified in the adminis-
trative investigation that preceded the lawsuit, the Commission conciliated with the 
employer with respect to each victim separately, and each victim was individually 
identified in the complaint filed in federal district court.   
 In practice, however, the EEOC has a long history of litigating class ac-
tions, including to multi-million dollar consent decrees, in cases in which many 
relief recipients were identified only in the course of the litigation or during relief 
proceedings. Certainly this was true, for example, in Chicago Miniature (phase I 
liability verdict reversed on appeal), Mitsubishi ($34 million consent decree), Dial 
Corporation ($10 million consent decree), Sears Roebuck ($6.2 million consent 
decree), Supervalu ($3.2 million consent decree), and International Profit Associ-
ates ($8 million consent decree)—all cases litigated by my office in Chicago.1 We 
in Chicago were therefore rocked by the initial success of United Parcel Service in 
one of our maximum leave/discharge cases brought under the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act (ADA).2 
In this short Article, I trace the extended proceedings on the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss in United Parcel Service for three reasons. First, in my mind, 
United Parcel Service signals the demise of a defense strategy that never had any 
real merit. Second, United Parcel Service illuminates how procedures routinely 
taken for granted, such as pleading rules perhaps deemed inconsequential, can have 
an enormous impact on the ability of the EEOC to secure civil rights on the job. 
Third, United Postal Service is a teaching moment for civil rights litigators, show-
ing that persistence in the pursuit of a better outcome can make a difference. 
I. ProceedIngs on defendant’s MotIon to dIsMIss In United Parcel Service
      A. Motion to Dismiss 
 Early on in United Parcel Service, Judge Robert M. Dow of the Northern 
District of Illinois appeared to introduce a new factor into the Iqbal-Twombly cal-
     1.  See infra aPPendIx. 
     2.  See EEOC v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 09-CV-5291, 2010 WL 3700704 (N.D. 
Ill. filed Aug. 27, 2009).
92
   Fall 2013                 Why It is They and Not We Who Sit on the Woolsack
culus in ADA cases.3 He struck down the EEOC’s allegations that United Parcel 
Service (UPS) failed to reasonably accommodate a disabled charging party on the 
grounds that “the complaint [did] not allege sufficient facts demonstrating that [the 
charging party] (or the potential class members) were qualified individuals.”4 It 
was not the first time an EEOC claim with respect to a charging party had been 
dismissed. Completely unexpected, however, was the clause pertaining to the dis-
missal with respect to the class—the members of which the EEOC had not identi-
fied in the complaint and that it expected to identify during the litigation. While 
the EEOC worked to overturn the unprecedented ruling, UPS aimed its efforts at 
upholding the dismissal. Over the following two-plus years, both parties continued 
to litigate the motion to dismiss before Judge Dow. Judge Dow first wrote: 
[A]s currently pled, the EEOC’s complaint is so threadbare, con-
clusory, and formulaic that it does not even allow the Court to rea-
sonably infer that [the charging party] or proposed class members 
have a plausible basis for claiming to be “otherwise qualified to per-
form the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable 
accommodation.”5 
Judge Dow’s initial opinion does not indicate how high the court intended to set 
the bar for EEOC pleadings under the ADA. Nevertheless, there was a basis for 
concern in its statement that “the complaint does not allege sufficient facts dem-
onstrating that [the charging party] (or the potential class members) were qualified 
individuals.”6 One perspective is that demonstrating sounds very much like estab-
lishing or proving, and that is exactly what the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—
even post-Iqbal—do not require. 
 Additionally troubling is the court’s proposition that disability cases are 
different, as far as pleading is concerned, from Title VII race cases “[b]ecause dis-
ability, unlike race, in some circumstances can be a legitimate consideration in 
employment decisions. . . .”7 Finally, it is unclear what the court intended with its 
references to “potential class members.”8 How is the EEOC, when it proceeds on 
behalf of a class whose members will be identified during the course of litigation, 
supposed to demonstrate in its complaint that the potential class members are quali-
fied? May an employer successfully torpedo the pleading of an ADA class action by 
suppressing enough information during the EEOC’s pre-suit administrative process 
     3.  Id.
     4.  Memorandum Opinion and Order at 7, United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-CV-5291, 
2010 WL 3700704, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2010) (emphasis added). 
     5.  Id. (citation omitted).
     6.  Id. (emphasis added). 
     7.  Id. at 9. 
     8.  Id. at 7.
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to prevent the agency from making the kind of demonstration in the complaint that 
the court thinks necessary? 
On September 30, 2010, twenty days after dismissal of its first complaint, 
the EEOC filed a first amended complaint.9 In the first amended complaint, the 
EEOC alleged that:  
Since at least 2002, UPS has maintained an inflexible 12-month 
leave policy which does not provide for reasonable accommodation 
of qualified individuals with disabilities and which instead provides 
for termination of their employment, in violation of Sections 102(a) 
and 102(b)(3)(A) and (b)(5)(A) of Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
12112(a) and 12112(b)(3)(A) and (b)(5)(A).10 
  
The EEOC described in detail the effect of this policy on two victims, Trudi Mom-
sen and Mavis Luvert.11 The EEOC then described a class of additional victims 
affected by the same policy—a class of victims for whom the EEOC is seeking 
relief:12
Similar to Momsen and Luvert, each class member is a qualified 
individual with a disability who could perform the essential func-
tions of his or her job with or without a reasonable accommodation. 
Because disabilities, and the reasonable accommodations appropri-
ate for particular individuals with disabilities, may vary significant-
ly, the reasonable accommodations which UPS should have made 
available to class members to permit them to perform the essential 
functions of their jobs (with or without a reasonable accommoda-
tion), would not have all been the same. The reasonable accommo-
dations would have varied from class member to class member on 
an individual basis, as determined through an interactive process 
between UPS and the individual class members. However, rather 
than engage in that interactive process and reasonably accommodate 
     
     9.  First Amended Complaint at 2–3, United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-CV-291 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 30, 2010).
     10.  Id. at 2–4.
     11.  See id. at 3–5.   
     12.  See id. at 5. The adequacy of the EEOC’s allegations as to Momsen and Luvert ceased 
to figure in the dispute. See Plaintiff EEOC’s Motion for 1292(b) Certification at 3, United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-CV-5291 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2012) (“The adequacy of EEOC’s plead-
ing with regard to these claimants is not at issue.”); Memorandum Opinion and Order at 3, 
United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-CV-5291 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2013) (court noted “EEOC filed an 
amended complaint asserting more robustly pleaded claims on behalf of Momsen [and] Luvert” 
and otherwise addressed only unidentified victims). 
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these class members, without undue hardship to itself, UPS termi-
nated the class members’ employment, pursuant to its policy de-
scribed in paragraph 8.13
 The court, at that time, refused to allow the EEOC to proceed with its claims 
for relief on behalf of these claimants, stating:
[T]he EEOC has not alleged adequate factual information in its 
complaint with respect to the unidentified class members as it has 
not pleaded with adequate specificity facts establishing the plausi-
bility of a claim that each class member is a qualified individual 
under the ADA who could have performed his or her job with or 
without a reasonable accommodation. Without additional detail, the 
EEOC’s allegations do not “raise a right to relief above the specula-
tive level.” The Court therefore grants UPS’s motion to dismiss the 
claims with respect to unidentified class members . . . .14   
The EEOC then motioned for leave to file its second amended complaint, adding 
a claim under Section 102(b)(6) of the ADA, but not alleging any additional facts 
with regard to unidentified class members.15 The court dismissed this motion for 
leave to file the second amended complaint, stating “[b]ecause Section 102(b)(6) 
only protects qualified individuals with disabilities, the EEOC needed to plead with 
adequate specificity facts supporting its contention that the unidentified class mem-
bers meet this requirement.”16  
 Subsequently, the EEOC sought certification for interlocutory review of this 
decision as to its claim on behalf of unidentified victims.17 In determining to pursue 
an interlocutory appeal, we at the EEOC considered where the district court might 
have conceptually gone off the tracks. The court’s own language from its dismissal 
of the EEOC’s first amended complaint was revealing.18 The court stated that the 
EEOC “has not pleaded with adequate specificity facts establishing the plausibility 
of a claim that each class member is a qualified individual. . . .”19 That is to say, 
the court appeared to be holding that there are a multiplicity of claims in the case, 
     13.  Plaintiff EEOC’s Motion for 1292(b) Certification, supra note 12.
     14.  Memorandum Opinion and Order at 7, United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-CV-5291(N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 28, 2012) (emphasis added) (quoting EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 
773, 777 (7th Cir. 2007)).
     15.  See Second Amended Complaint, United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-CV-5291 (N.D. Ill. 
Oct. 20, 2011), 2011 WL 10830358.
     16.  Memorandum Opinion and Order, United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-CV-5291 (N.D. 
Ill. July 3, 2012).
     17.  See Plaintiff EEOC’s Motion for 1292(b) Certification, supra note 12.
     18.  Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 14.
     19.  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Concentra Health Servs., Inc., at 777 (7th Cir. 2007)).
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each one separately either belonging to or being made on behalf of each class mem-
ber and each of which must appear in a complaint to be separately and individu-
ally plausible.20 The problem is that in cases brought by the EEOC the only party 
plaintiff is the EEOC, and there is only one claim—the claim brought by the EEOC 
against the employer on the grounds of discrimination. That single claim, in and of 
itself, satisfies the Iqbal plausibility requirement.21 
 B. Reconsideration of Motion to Dismiss
 Dedicated litigators are seldom willing to “cut some slack” for colleagues 
on the bench who, in the litigators’ own esteemed judgment, “got it wrong.” But at 
times, some of our brethren in black robes show us why it is they and not we who sit 
“on the woolsack.”22 That is precisely what happened in United Parcel Service.23 In 
an extended memorandum opinion and order entered January 11, 2013, Judge Dow 
exhaustively reviewed the litigation of the motion to dismiss and the applicable 
law (including Iqbal and Twombly), and on his own motion reconsidered.24 Judge 
Dow withdrew his earlier rulings, denied the UPS motion to dismiss, granted the 
EEOC leave to file its second amended complaint, and denied the EEOC’s motion 
for a certificate of appealability as moot.25 The court’s language turned everything 
     
     20. See generally United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2010 WL 3700704. 
     21. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009).  
     22. Students of Willis L.M. Reese, the great Columbia Law School professor and Ameri-
can Law Institute reporter, will recall the towering figure with the enormous wing-span he was 
in the classroom. They will recall him describing—with wings extended—how in the earli-
est days courts were sometimes convened in the shade of large trees, and the judges, perhaps 
“sitting in chancery,” might be seated before the petitioners on sacks full of wool, which may 
have been awaiting delivery or sale, or even have been the subject of “the litigation.” Hence, 
the earliest dispensers of the common law and their brethren to this day may be said, at least to 
the still admiring students of Professor Reese to “sit on the woolsack.” It is an article of faith 
among those who practice the profession that “on the woolsack” is a noble place to sit.
     23.  See generally Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 12.
     24.  Id. at 1.
     25.  Id. at 1–2. As to whether a federal judge’s doing a 180-degree turnaround without 
having been reversed is actually noteworthy, consider an October 16, 2013, story in The New 
York Times headlined Judge in Landmark Case Disavows Support for Voter ID. John Schwartz, 
Judge in Landmark Case Disavows Support for Voter ID, n.Y. tIMes, Oct. 16, 2013, at A16. 
The reporter observed that “it is the kind of thought that rarely passes the lips of a member of 
the federal judiciary: I was wrong,” and took note of a new book by Seventh Circuit U.S. Court 
of Appeals Judge Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging. Id. The article states that in the 
book Judge Posner wrote, “I plead guilty to having written the majority opinion” in Crawford v. 
Marion County Election Board, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court in 2008. Id. In Craw-
ford, the Seventh Circuit upheld an Indiana voter identification law, which Judge Posner wrote 
is “‘a type of law now widely regarded as a means of voter suppression rather than of fraud 
prevention.’” Id. The New York Times article further noted that when Judge Posner was asked 
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around and made it right:
      Upon revisiting EEOC’s first amended complaint, and draw-
ing all reasonable inferences in the EEOC’s favor, the Court con-
cludes that the first amended complaint satisfies these standards and 
should not have been dismissed. . . .
 But this broader case is brought by EEOC, which frequent-
ly and in this instance “does not stand in the employee’s shoes.” 
EEOC, charged with “advanc[ing] the public interest in preventing 
and remedying employment discrimination,” is pursuing this action 
on behalf of a nationwide class of aggrieved individuals. And al-
though EEOC is subject to the federal pleading rules when acting in 
this capacity, the unique role of the EEOC is such that courts gener-
ally have allowed complaints with “class” allegations comparable 
to those asserted here to move forward, both pre- and post-Twombly 
and Iqbal . . . . 
      Iqbal and Twombly do not require plaintiffs, including EEOC, 
to plead detailed factual allegations supporting the individual claims 
of every possible member of a class. EEOC must merely “plead[] 
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable infer-
ence” that UPS violated provisions of the ADA as to the unidentified 
individuals. It has done that.26 
Judge Dow declined to follow the once trendsetting decision in EEOC v. 
CRST Van Expedited, Inc.27 CRST was a Title VII class action sex discrimination 
case. The EEOC contended that the national long haul trucking company main-
tained a system in which newly-hired female driver-trainees were sexually harassed 
by experienced male drivers assigned to accompany, train, and supervise them dur-
ing their initial long haul runs.28 The district court entered summary judgment in 
favor of defendant CRST and against the EEOC on the EEOC’s pattern or practice 
claim. It then dismissed the remaining sixty-seven individual claims that survived 
summary judgment on the grounds that the EEOC did not, during the statutory pre-
suit conciliation process, specifically identify and attempt to negotiate settlements 
in an October 11, 2013, Huffington Post video interview whether the court had gotten its ruling 
in Crawford wrong he responded, “‘Yes. Absolutely.’” Id. While Judge Posner’s about-face in 
Crawford comes too late to have avoided the Supreme Court’s compounding of the error, it will 
hopefully check the impact of the decision.
     26.  Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 12, at 8–11 (alteration in original) (cita-
tions omitted). 
     27.  679 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2012).
     28.  Id. at 665–67.
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with respect to each class member separately.29 The EEOC’s position was that the 
law did not require such separate individualized negotiations during conciliation.30 
In any event, the EEOC argued such negotiations would have been impossible be-
cause during the agency’s administrative investigation that preceded conciliation 
CRST refused and failed to disclose numerous complaints of sexual harassment 
that would have made victim identification possible.31 
In declining to follow CRST, Judge Dow wrote: 
[T]he Seventh Circuit has made clear that courts “have no business limiting 
[an EEOC] suit to claims that the court finds to be supported by the evi-
dence obtained in the Commission’s investigation,” and EEOC has alleged 
. . . that “[a]ll conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have 
been fulfilled.”32
But the United Parcel Service motion to dismiss saga had not fully run its course. 
     29.  Id. at 670–74.
     30.  Id. at 673. 
     31.  See Circuit Judge Murphy’s dissent in CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d at 695–97 
(8th Cir. 2012) (“Although many women had reported harassment . . . CRST furnished to the 
Commission only two names. . . . Using [the majority’s] standard employers can avoid disclo-
sure to the EEOC of complaining workers [during] investigation and conciliation, then reveal 
the names during court order discovery, and seek dismissal of the entire case on the ground of 
inadequate pursuit efforts by the EEOC.”).
     32.  Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 12, at 11–12 (second and third altera-
tions in original) (citations omitted). Judge Dow is not alone in declining to follow CRST and 
allowing unidentified victims to be in a suit as a class, rather than as individuals. See, e.g., 
EEOC v. United States Steel Corp., No. 10-1284, 2012 WL 3017869, at *18 (W.D. Pa. July 23, 
2012) (citations omitted) (finding after a survey of decisions including post-Iqbal and Twombly 
decisions that naming as of yet unidentified victims in the complaint by the EEOC was not re-
quired: “[t]his Court agrees with these decisions and likewise holds that Iqbal and Twombly do 
not require the EEOC to name all of the potential class members in its amended Complaint. The 
Court acknowledges U.S. Steel’s emphasis in [CRST]. However, the Court notes that the Eighth 
Circuit’s holdings in CRST are not binding on this Court.”); EEOC v. Source One Staffing, Inc., 
No. 11-C-6754, 2013 WL 25033, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2013) (granting the EEOC motion for a 
protective order, notwithstanding defendant’s invocation of CRST: “this Court already has held 
that the EEOC cannot reasonably be expected to identify the ‘class members’ who were denied 
job assignments because of their sex or estimate the damages resulting from an alleged pattern 
or practice of discrimination without expert analysis of . . . assignment and payroll data” pro-
duced in discovery); EEOC v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884, 904–05 (6th Cir. 2012) (disagreeing 
with a lower court’s reliance on CRST, the court said that, “[W]e recognized that ‘the nature and 
extent of an EEOC investigation. . .  is a matter within the discretion of th[e] agency’. . . . Given 
that [the EEOC letter of determination and proposed conciliation agreement] were provided to 
Cintas . . . there is no basis for concluding that Cintas was unaware that the EEOC had investi-
gated and was seeking to conciliate class-wide claims. . . . [I[t is clear that the EEOC satisfied 
its administrative prerequisites to suit.”).
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On February 1, 2013, UPS petitioned Judge Dow to certify a “question” supposedly 
related to his January 11, 2013, order: “Can EEOC satisfy the pleading requirements 
of [Twombly] . . . when each proposed individual for whom EEOC seeks relief was 
unable to work for 12 months at the time of separation?”33 UPS apparently hoped 
to convince Judge Dow and the Seventh Circuit that it could never be a reason-
able accommodation to allow a day more than twelve months leave, and therefore 
that any complaint suggesting anything to the contrary could never be “plausible,” 
even if it was the employer itself who was responsible for the absence.34 Under 
this theory, it would be permissible for UPS to keep disabled workers off the job 
for twelve months by denying an employee who was released to return to work the 
opportunity to do so, and then terminating him or her at the twelve-month mark. 
Suffice it to say that UPS’s contentions had not figured in Judge Dow’s January 11, 
2013 Memorandum Opinion and Order35 and they sounded more like arguments 
appropriate, if at all, for a motion for summary judgment.   
 Judge Dow remained convinced that, although the issue before him in-
volved a controlling and contestable question of law, his decision denying the UPS 
motion to dismiss was correct and that permitting an interlocutory appeal would not 
materially advance the ultimate termination of the case36:
[T]he Court remains confident of the correctness of its January 11 
ruling—indeed, it would not have reconsidered on its own motion 
the prior ruling had that not been the case—the fact that the same 
judge has viewed the question to be close enough to warrant recon-
sideration is testimony to both the difficulty and the contestability 
of the issue . . . .
     After careful consideration of the alternative paths . . . the Court 
concludes that further litigation in the district court, augmented as 
appropriate with expedited briefing on potentially dispositive issues, 
would serve the interests of justice and efficiency better than certify-
ing a question or an issue for interlocutory appeal. The Court there-
fore denies the motion for interlocutory appeal . . . . 37
 So that is how things stand in EEOC v. United Parcel Service as of summer 
     
     33. Plaintiff EEOC’s Motion for 1292(b) Certification, supra note 12, at 2. 
     34.  See id. at 2–3 (“Indeed, EEOC’s unsupported conclusion that all class members fall 
within the protected class is highly doubtful because every class member was unable to work 
for 12 months at the time of separation and the Seventh Circuit has never found any employee 
who missed more than two months of work to be a qualified individual with a disability.”).
     35.  See Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 12.
     36.  See generally Memorandum Opinion and Order, United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-CV-
5291 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2013). 
     37.  Id. 
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2013.38 The case has now been referred to the assigned magistrate judge for super-
vision of discovery and exploration of settlement.39 Either way, the court has taken 
an important step back from the brink and the notion that the EEOC cannot pursue 
relief with respect to victims who are not identified in the EEOC’s complaint has 
proven to be a short-lived trend.
II.     LookIng ahead
 It is a good thing that the trend was short lived. If United Parcel Service 
had been decided differently, there would be two concerns as to how it would have 
combined with Iqbal and Twombly to affect EEOC employment discrimination liti-
gation down the road, and how even as decided, it may still affect other districts 
and courts. The first concern is that if there was a genuine, long-term trend away 
from notice pleading, the EEOC might be expected to begin specifically demon-
strating in its complaints, including in class actions, that its stated claim against an 
employer was an aggregation of individual claims of class members, each of which 
would be separately considered “plausible” on an individual basis. Such an out-
come would likely spell the end of class litigation by the EEOC, except on behalf of 
the smallest classes of victims of discrimination. Can one imagine such a complaint 
if there were 100 class members? What if there were 400 or more?
 The EEOC has, for a very long time as a litigating agency, pursued relief not 
only on behalf of victims of discrimination specifically identified in the course of its 
administrative investigations, but also on behalf of victims identified through dis-
covery in the course of litigation—that is, after suit is filed. In many cases such as 
Chicago Miniature,40 Mitsubishi,41 Dial,42 Sears Roebuck,43 and Roadway,44 enough 
victims of the particular kind of discrimination at issue were identified during the 
administrative investigation to lead to the inescapable conclusion that employers 
were acting illegally, not only with respect to those victims, but also with many 
     38.  United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2010 WL 3700704. Therein lies the downside to this tale of 
justice prevailing: EEOC v. United Parcel Service was filed in the Northern District of Illinois 
on August 27, 2009, and as the case approached its third anniversary, the motion to dismiss 
proceeding had just concluded and discovery was just set to begin. One could observe that the 
wheels of justice do grind slowly.
     39.  Order of the Executive Committee, United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-CV-5291 (N.D. 
Ill. June 11, 2013).
     40.  EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 622 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev’d, 
947 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1991).
     41.  EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 102 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 1996). 
     42.  EEOC v. Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
     43.  EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 04-C-7282, 2005 WL 2664367 (N.D. Ill. filed 
Nov. 10, 2004).
     44.  EEOC v. Roadway Express, Inc., No. 06-C-4805, 2007 WL 2198363 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 31, 
2007).
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others yet to be identified. Often they were unidentified because employers were 
unable or unwilling to provide, prior to litigation, information with regard to many 
employees and applicants. In those cases, discovery under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure was the only process by which the EEOC could identify those vic-
tims and gather details about the specific discrimination they faced.
 Plainly, it would be impossible for the EEOC to demonstrate plausibility 
within the four corners of a complaint with respect to specific members of a victim 
class that the EEOC has not yet identified without any discovery. However, if that 
is where the federal courts were to head—and I do not believe they have or will—it 
would severely prejudice the performance of the EEOC’s legal mandate to combat 
and eradicate employment discrimination.
 I do not believe federal courts will endorse onerous pleading requirements 
with respect to the EEOC class actions anytime soon. Nevertheless, there have been 
a few isolated district courts that have deemed it appropriate to enter substantive 
adverse judgments on the merits in the EEOC cases. This is not merely because the 
EEOC did not plead specifics with respect to individual victims, but also because 
the EEOC did not specifically and individually investigate and conciliate with re-
spect to unidentified victims and their particular circumstances during the admin-
istrative process before agency litigation.45 In my estimation, those decisions are 
     
     45.  See, e.g., EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2012); EEOC v. 
Bloomberg L.P., No. 07-CV-8383, 2013 WL 4799150, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2013) (granting 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment:“[T]he Court adopts the . . . reasoning from Chief 
Judge Linda P. Reade’s analysis in [CRST], a case dismissed under similar circumstances.”). 
The approach of these courts is contrary to the notion that the EEOC’s administrative processes, 
including investigations and conciliations, are wholly within the discretion of the agency. For 
example, EEOC v. Caterpillar, 409 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2005), holds that the agency’s investiga-
tions are not subject to judicial review. Title VII itself provides that the only test for a concili-
ation agreement is whether it is “acceptable” to the EEOC and that conciliation materials are 
confidential. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006). With respect to conciliation, District Judge Joe Billy 
McDade observed in EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., “A review of the relevant statutory lan-
guage on conciliation reveals that substantial discretion is vested in the Commission . . . . An 
effort by the Senate in 1972 to require judicial review of the Commission’s determinations of 
‘acceptable’ agreements was soundly rejected. 118 Cong. Rec. 3807 (Feb. 14, 1972). Such an 
examination of the conciliation process was deemed unworkable. Id. at 3807.” 504 F. Supp. 
241, 262 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff’d, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). Further, under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) and otherwise, conciliation agreements are not subject to judicial review 
because they do not constitute final agency decisions, and employers are always entitled to a 
trial de novo on the issue of whether or not they engaged in employment discrimination. See, 
e.g., Doe v. Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 710–11 (7th Cir. 2006) (employing APA analysis to find Title 
VII does not require charging party cooperation with EEOC conciliation prior to private suit); 
Caterpillar, 409 F.3d at 832 (court relies on cases decided under the APA to find the EEOC 
reasonable cause determination was not subject to review); Stewart v. EEOC, 611 F.2d 679, 
681–83 (7th Cir. 1979) (relying on the APA in rejecting a challenge to EEOC process). As 
District Judge Milton Shadur observed years ago during an unreported colloquy at a hearing 
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outliers and will wither and die on the vine, and never again receive any significant 
following. Judge Dow’s rulings in United Parcel Service and other cases referred to 
in this Article indicate that this process is already underway and I think irreversible. 
 The second concern relates to the conceptual basis some defense counsel 
propose as a justification for their demands wanting an extraordinary amount of de-
tail in employment discrimination complaints. Based on their reading of Iqbal and 
Twombly, they argue that significant detail and specificity within complaints is nec-
essary because otherwise employers do not know and cannot know the nature of the 
actionable conduct with which they are charged. That situation may arise in select 
cases with highly complex claims, but seldom in employment discrimination cases. 
Overwhelmingly, standard notice pleading requirements have been more than suf-
ficient for both plaintiffs and defendants. Further, because of the administrative 
process that precedes and undergirds the EEOC litigation—a process in which the 
employer-defendant is a party—protests of  “don’t know” and “can’t know” do not 
ring true.46  
attended by the author in the Chicago Miniature case, when sued for employment discrimi-
nation employers are not entitled to two bites of the apple, with the first being litigation of 
the EEOC administrative process and the second being the question of whether or not there 
was discrimination. See EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 526 F. Supp. 974, 975–76 
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (discussing the “undesirability of turning every properly-filed EEOC action 
into a two-fold action”).  As this Article was going to press, it became clear that, at least in 
the Seventh Circuit, the EEOC has it right with respect to judicial review of conciliation. On 
June 28, 2013, in an unusual move, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted 
the EEOC’s petition for an interlocutory appeal in EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11-CV-
879, 2012 WL 3800787 (S.D. Ill. May 30, 2013), in order to consider “the question whether 
an alleged failure to conciliate is subject to judicial review in the form of an implied affirma-
tive defense to the EEOC’s suit.” EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 13-2456, slip op. at 2 (7th 
Cir. Dec. 20, 2013).  On December 20, 2013, the Seventh Circuit announced a decision which 
unequivocally supported the EEOC position, writing, 
The language of [Title VII], the lack of a meaningful standard for courts to apply, 
and the overall statutory scheme convince us that an alleged failure to conciliate is
not an affirmative defense to the merits of a discrimination suit. . . . We therefore 
disagree with our colleagues in other circuits and hold that the statutory directive 
to  the EEOC to negotiate first and sue later does not implicitly create a defense
for employers who have allegedly violated Title VII.
Id. How squarely the entire Seventh Circuit stands behind this important decision is telegraphed 
by the following extraordinary footnote: “We have circulated this opinion among all judges of 
this court in regular active service pursuant to Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge favored a rehear-
ing en banc on the question of rejecting the implied affirmative defense for failure to concili-
ate.” Id. at 23 n.3. 
     46.  By the time an EEOC case gets to court, the employer has typically: (1) dealt directly 
with the charging party and class members, perhaps as long-term employees; (2) received a 
charge of discrimination stating the charging party’s claim; (3) had an opportunity to mediate 
the charge; (4) received requests for information and documents telegraphing the issues and 
circumstances the EEOC is investigating; (5) prepared, usually with the assistance of counsel, 
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No one possesses more knowledge about an employer’s policies, practices, 
and experiences with victims of employment discrimination than the employer.47 
Even if an employer is unaware of the facts and circumstances surrounding alleged 
discrimination before a charge is filed, by the time the EEOC files a complaint in 
federal district court, the nature of the process has “educated” the employer and 
claims to the contrary are almost always gamesmanship.  The Federal Rules of Civ-
il Procedure were designed precisely to supplant such antiquated schemes. Judge 
Dow’s consideration of the defendant’s motion to dismiss in the EEOC v. United 
Parcel Service gives me confidence that the modern principles memorialized in the 
federal rules will survive the of recent squall surrounding Iqbal and Twombly.
a position statement detailing the charging party’s history and responding to the claim(s) of dis-
crimination; (6) exchanged telephone calls and/or other correspondence with the EEOC staff; 
(7) had the opportunity—because it supplied it—to itself examine virtually all or much of the 
evidence the EEOC is looking at; (8) conducted its own investigation; (9) received a letter of 
determination stating the nature of the cause finding; and (10) had the opportunity to engage in 
conciliation during which the nature, scope, and remedy for the found discrimination may be 
discussed. See generally The Charge Handling Process, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/employ-
ers/process.cfm (Dec. 13, 2013).
     47.  Often in harassment cases, defendant-employers in conciliation and litigation take 
the position that the victim(s) did not complain and that the employer never knew about the 
harassment. Just as often discovery surfaces evidence that the victims did in fact complain, and 
that the employer had been dealing ineffectively with the harasser’s conduct for a long time—
sometimes for years—by employing a multitude of bad management techniques (for example, 
repeated verbal warnings, moving the harasser from one position or facility to another, telling 
victims to stay away from the harasser, etc.). When such employers protest they never knew, 
one can be forgiven for raising an eyebrow. As for no one ever complaining, here is a reveal-
ing vignette: The author recently sat through a conciliation meeting at which the employer was 
represented by three attorneys, with two from one of the nation’s most highly regarded New 
York “white shoe” law firms. A third attorney pushed the argument that no complaints had been 
made. We later learned that, by that time, a charge of discrimination relating to the exact issue 
presented had been filed prior to the conciliation meeting. When lead counsel was thereafter 
confronted with this fact, the response was not that lead counsel didn’t know, but rather that it 
was another attorney at the table who had made the misrepresentation. Lesson learned.
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aPPendIx
EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works 
 For more information on the Chicago Miniature case, see EEOC v. Chicago 
Miniature Lamp Works, 526 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (in this Title VII class 
action recruitment and hiring case alleging racial discrimination, the court denied 
the company’s motion for summary judgment, holding in November 1981 that the 
EEOC’s determination that on its face states that widespread discrimination found in 
investigation, followed by pleading, satisfied the jurisdictional requirement of Title 
VII). This was followed by EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 622 F. Supp. 
1281 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev’d, 947 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1991) (EEOC class-wide recruit-
ment and hiring claims were found to be appropriate because they developed in 
course of a reasonable investigation of the plaintiff’s charge; while the court found 
that there was a pattern and practice of class discrimination against black workers, 
the court did not find that the individual plaintiff was discriminated against). For the 
decision on remedies that followed, see EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 
640 F. Supp 1291 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 1986) (holding that consistent discriminatory 
underrepresentation of blacks in the employer’s recruitment and hiring for entry lev-
el factory jobs constituted a violation, such that every victim of the employer’s dis-
crimination during set time period could become a class member entitled to relief). 
This was followed by EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 668 F. Supp. 1150 
(N.D. Ill. 1987) (holding that in context of shortfall/pro rata procedure for class-
wide distribution of back pay, district court would implement back pay procedure to 
comply with statutory mandate). Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 526 F. Supp. 974, 
was reversed  by 947 F.2d at 305–06 (holding that disparate treatment and disparate 
impact findings were erroneous because they credited statistics that did not take into 
account applicant preference and because anecdotal evidence presented at trial was 
not significantly probative).
 For more information, see also EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 
110 F.R.D. 120 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (after district court found employment discrimina-
tion on part of defendant-employer in class action, but ruled individual plaintiff had 
not himself been victim of racial discrimination, individual plaintiff filed motion to 
effect immediate appeal; the district court held that individual plaintiff entitled to 
appeal disposition of claim immediately). 
 For more information, see also Randolph v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 
No. 79-C-2362, 1986 WL 9535 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 22, 1986) (granting a former Chi-
cago Miniature employee leave to proceed ‘forma pauperis’).
EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc. 
 For more information, see EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of 
104
   Fall 2013                 Why It is They and Not We Who Sit on the Woolsack
America, Inc.,102 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (Title VII, class action sexual harassment 
case in which the court upheld trial court order, which required the EEOC to send 
employees a letter detailing complaint process as related to defendant employer’s 
sexual harassment policy; motion for stay denied and appeal dismissed).
 For more information, see also EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of 
America, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1059 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that the EEOC complied 
with its statutory conciliation obligations before filing suit). 
 For more information, see also EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing 
of America, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 164 (C.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that the employer could 
not interview employees concerning past incidents of harassment or retaliation other 
than by noticed deposition, but could have ex parte contact with employees who 
initiated discussions about claims of new harassment).
EEOC v. Dial Corp.
  For more information, see Memorandum and Order on Defendant’s Motion 
in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Jane Doe and Related Evidence, EEOC v. Dial 
Corp., 16 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001), 2000 WL 33912745 (Title VII, class ac-
tion sexual harassment case, order granting defendant’s motion in limine to exclude 
‘irrelevant’ testimony of a female executive, Jane Doe). See also Memorandum and 
Order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Unseal Briefs, Hearing Transcript, Court Order and 
Deposition of Jane Doe, Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 926 (No. 99-C-3356), 2000 WL 
33912746 (denying the EEOC’s motion to unseal briefs of Jane Doe);  Memoran-
dum and Order on Plaintiff EEOC’s Motion for Reconsideration, Dial Corp., 156 F. 
Supp. 2d (No. 99-C-3356 2000 WL 684195 (granting the EEOC’s protective order 
to protect identities of members of class action suit). 
 This was followed by EEOC v. Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ill. 
2001) (holding that the EEOC satisfied statutory obligation to conciliate and that ad-
ministrative charge process was not circumvented), and then by Memorandum and 
Order on Defendant’s Motion for Contempt Order, Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d (No. 
99-C-3356), 2001 WL 1945089 (holding the EEOC in contempt for violating par-
ties’ stipulated protective order); Memorandum and Order on Defendant’s Motion 
for Certification of Issues for Appeal, Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d (No. 99-C-3356), 
2001 WL 1945088  (granting defendant’s motion for interlocutory review to deter-
mine, amongst other issues, whether Dial was given sufficient notice of the EEOC’s 
pattern and practice claim at the administrative stage where the underlying charge 
contained no allegations of a class-wide Title VII violation and the bulk of evidence 
relied upon by the EEOC was revealed after it filed suit); Memorandum and Order 
on Defendant’s Petition for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Incurred to Prepare and Pros-
ecute its Motion for an Order Holding EEOC in Contempt, Dial Corp, 156 F. Supp. 
2d (No. 99-C-3356), 2002 WL 1974084 (granting defendant’s petition for attorneys’ 
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fees and costs incurred to prepare and prosecute its motion for an order holding the 
EEOC in contempt); Second Memorandum and Order on Defendant’s Motion for 
Contempt Order, Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d (No. 99-C-3356), 2002 WL 1974085. 
(finding that the EEOC complied with defendant’s petition for attorney’s fees and 
costs, and the subject of that order was concluded). Those orders were followed by: 
Memorandum and Order on Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s 
Notice and Timeliness Rulings, Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d (No. 99-C-3356), 2002 
WL 1974072 (defendant’s motion denied); Memorandum and Order on Defendant’s 
Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiff’s Expert Testimony, Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 
2d (No. 99-C-3356), 2002 WL 31061088 (granting defendant’s motion, to an extent, 
by excluding relevant portions of  plaintiff’s expert report).
The motions were followed by the Memorandum and Order on Motion for Re-
consideration of September 18, 2002, Ruling on Dial’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, 
Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d (No. 99-C-3356), 2002 WL 32077351 (granting the 
EEOC’s Motion for Reconsideration on the following three issues: first, that the 
EEOC’s interrogatory responses were substantially correct; second, even in cases 
where later deposition testimony did not conform with earlier interrogatory respons-
es, the EEOC had a legitimate basis for including that information in its responses 
based on the EEOC’s reasonable inquiry and belief that answers were correct; third, 
the court’s reliance upon the EEOC’s legal assertion that each class member was sub-
jected to sexual and sex-based harassment as grounds for sanctions was improper).
For more information, see also Memorandum and Order on Defendant’s Motion 
for Reconsideration of the Court’s Denial of its Motion in Limine to Exclude Evi-
dence of Alleged Harassment Before 1991 and, Alternatively, to Exclude Evidence 
That is Not Relevant Background Evidence, Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d (No. 99-C-
3356), 2003 WL 1809467 (granting, in part, defendant’s motion; otherwise denying 
the motion); Dial Corp., 259 F. Supp. 2d 710 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (defendant’s motion 
for reconsideration of phased bifurcated arrangement laid out by the court denied). 
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
 For more information, see EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 04-C-7282, 
2005 WL 2664367 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 22, 2005) (ADA class action case regarding medical 
leave and reasonable accommodation, finding that the EEOC met its notice-pleading 
requirements and denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss case on grounds that the 
EEOC did not qualify class members under the ADA).
EEOC v. Supervalu, Inc.
 For more information, see EEOC v. Supervalu, Inc., No. 09-CV-5637, 2010 
WL 5071196 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2010) (ADA class action case regarding medical leave 
and reasonable accommodation, denying the defendant’s request that the EEOC 
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provide proper verification signed by each applicable claimant, instead requiring 
that the EEOC need only meet with each claimant regarding three of the interrogato-
ries, and to report inaccuracies from each claimant interrogatories to the defendant).
This was followed by Memorandum Opinion and Order, Supervalu, Inc., No. 
09-CV-5637 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2012), 2010 WL 5071196 (granting and denying in 
part, the defendant’s motion to compel properly verified responses to their first set of 
interrogatories; denying the plaintiff’s motion to compel a portion of the defendant’s 
human resources database; granting and denying in part, the plaintiff’s motion to 
compel regarding its Rule 34 request for entry upon land and inspection);  Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, Supervalu, Inc., No. 09-CV-5637 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 
2013), 2013 WL 1154217 (granting and denying in part the plaintiff’s motion for 
civil contempt sanctions and to conduct limited discovery). 
EEOC v. International Profit Associates, Inc.
 For more information, see EEOC v. International Profit Associates, Inc., 206 
F.R.D. 215 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (Title VII class action sexual harassment case, denying 
defendant’s motion to compel plaintiff’s production of interview notes because notes 
are protected by attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine). See also 
Porter v. Int’l Profit Assocs., Inc., Nos. 01-C-4427, 02-C-2790, 2003 WL 22956004 
(Dec. 11, 2003) (defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied).
This was followed by EEOC v. International Profit Associates, Inc., No. 01-C-
4427, 2007 WL 844555 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 16, 2007) (denying defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment and holding that the EEOC met notice-pleading standards for 
class suit, when defendant was engaged in pattern or practice of sexual discrimina-
tion towards all claimants generally); and by Order,  Int’l Profit Assoc. Inc., No. 01-
C-4427 (N.D. Ill., Feb 22, 2008), 2008 WL 485130 (denying defendant’s motion to 
reconsider order prohibiting settlement communications with claimants). 
 This was followed by EEOC v. International Profit Associates, Inc., 654 
F.Supp. 2d 767 (N.D. Ill. 2009) and  Memorandum and Order, International Profit 
Associates, Inc., No. 01-C-4427 (N.D. Ill., Feb 22, 2008), 2008 WL 4876860 (defen-
dant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to three claimants granted; defen-
dant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to three other claimants denied).
 This was followed by EEOC v. International Profit Associates, Inc., 647 
F.Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (defendant’s motion for summary judgment with 
respect to eight claimants granted; defendant’s motion for summary judgment with 
respect to twenty-four other claimants denied), and EEOC v. International Profit 
Associates, Inc., No. 01-C-4427, 2010 WL 1416153 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 31, 2010) (de-
nying defendant’s motion for summary judgment). 
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